| Feature | Conventional conflict | Cyber operations |
|---|---|---|
| Borders | Physical, visible | Traffic crosses many countries in seconds |
| Identity of attacker | Usually known | Hidden behind proxies, stolen infrastructure and false clues |
| Cost of entry | High - armies, equipment | Low - skills, software, rented servers |
| Actors | Mainly states | States, proxies, criminals, activists and individuals |
| Threshold of war | Fairly clear | Many operations stay below the level of armed attack - a 'grey zone' |
Cyber operations are cheap, deniable and often below the threshold of war - so attribution is uncertain, and resilience (deterrence by denial) matters more than threats of retaliation.
- Cyberspace weakens borders, hides attackers and blurs peace and war.
- Attribution has technical, operational and political levels, each harder than the last.
- Existing international law is accepted as applying to cyberspace; its detailed application is debated.
- Deterrence by denial is especially important because punishment needs attribution.