• Advanced
  • About 16 min
  • 5 practice questions

Attack paths: which fraud defeats which login

Map each authentication factor to the frauds that capture it and find the cheapest attack that defeats a given login.

If something looks wrong, please tell us.

The practice course taught you to count authentication factors and to name a fraud from a scenario. Hard questions join the two. They describe a login or a payment flow and ask which single fraud would be enough to defeat it, or which change would force the attacker to combine two frauds. The tool for these questions is an attack-path map: for every factor in the flow, list the frauds that can capture it, then look for one fraud, or the smallest combination, that captures all of them.

Step 1: map factors to frauds

Start from the categories. A knowledge factor such as a password or PIN is captured by phishing, smishing, vishing, shoulder surfing, a hidden camera, or a remote-access app that watches the screen while it is typed. A possession factor proved by an SMS one-time password is captured by SIM swap, by vishing (the victim reads the code out), by remote access (the code appears on screen), or by real-time phishing, where a fake website passes the victim's code to the real site within seconds. A card as a possession factor is captured by skimming, which produces a copy, or by plain theft. An inherence factor checked on the customer's own device, such as a fingerprint unlocking the phone, is much harder to capture remotely: it cannot be read off a screen or out of a text message.

Attack-path map
FactorFrauds that can capture it
Password or PIN (knowledge)Phishing, smishing, vishing, shoulder surfing, hidden camera, remote access
SMS OTP (possession of the number)SIM swap, vishing, remote access, real-time phishing
Card (possession)Skimming (copy), theft
Fingerprint checked on the device (inherence)Not captured by any of the remote methods above

Step 2: find the cheapest path

A login is only as strong as the cheapest path through it. If one fraud appears in the row of every factor, that fraud alone defeats the login. If no single fraud covers every row, the attacker needs a combination, which is harder and rarer. So the exam shortcut is: look for a fraud that appears in every row of the login's factors.

Worked example 1: password plus SMS OTP

A bank's website asks for a password and then an SMS OTP. Which single fraud is enough? Working: the password row lists phishing, smishing, vishing, shoulder surfing, camera, remote access. The OTP row lists SIM swap, vishing, remote access, real-time phishing. Frauds in both rows: vishing (the caller asks for both), remote access (both appear on the screen), and real-time phishing (the fake site takes the password and relays the OTP). SIM swap alone is not enough, because it gives the OTP but not the password. Answer: any of vishing, remote access or real-time phishing; SIM swap needs a partner fraud.

Worked example 2: card plus PIN at an ATM

Which single scheme defeats card-plus-PIN at an ATM? Working: the card row lists skimming and theft; the PIN row lists shoulder surfing, a hidden camera and others. A skimming kit that includes a hidden camera or false keypad covers both rows in one installation. Phishing by email covers the PIN at best, not the card. Answer: a skimming kit with a camera or overlay keypad. Notice why such kits come as a pair: skimming alone is useless without the PIN.

A login is as strong as its cheapest attack path. Map each factor to the frauds that capture it; a fraud that appears in every row defeats the login alone. Vishing, remote access and real-time phishing each capture both a password and an SMS OTP; SIM swap captures only the OTP.

What raises the bar

The map also shows what a defender should change. Replacing a second knowledge item with a device-checked biometric removes the factor from almost every remote row. Making the customer confirm the exact payee and amount inside the approval step weakens real-time phishing, because the victim sees what is really being approved. And teaching customers that no genuine caller ever needs an OTP removes vishing from the OTP row.

Key takeaways: list frauds against each factor; a fraud in every row is a single-fraud attack; SIM swap must be paired with a stolen password; vishing, remote access and real-time phishing each defeat password-plus-OTP alone; skimming needs a camera or false keypad to be complete; device-checked biometrics fall outside the remote rows.

Check your understanding

  1. 1. A login uses a password and an SMS OTP. Which fraud is NOT enough on its own to defeat it?

    1. SIM swap
    2. Vishing
    3. Real-time phishing
    4. A remote-access app
    Show answer

    Answer: A. SIM swap captures the OTP but not the password. Vishing, real-time phishing and remote access each capture both.

  2. 2. Why do skimming kits usually include a hidden camera or false keypad?

    1. The camera records the magnetic stripe data as the card is swiped
    2. The PIN is already printed on the back of every bank card
    3. Copied card data is of little use at an ATM without the PIN
    4. The camera is there to switch off the ATM's alarm and cameras
    Show answer

    Answer: C. Card-plus-PIN has two rows; skimming covers only the card, so the kit adds a way to capture the PIN.

  3. 3. In real-time phishing, what lets the attacker defeat an SMS OTP?

    1. The attacker guesses the six digits correctly before the code expires
    2. The fake site passes the victim's code to the real site within its validity
    3. The OTP is identical on every login so it can be reused later
    4. The fake site makes a duplicate SIM card to receive the message
    Show answer

    Answer: B. The OTP is valid for a short time only, so the attacker relays it live through the fake site while it still works.

  4. 4. Which factor is hardest to capture by remote methods such as phishing, vishing or screen sharing?

    1. A password typed into a banking website
    2. An SMS OTP sent to the customer's phone number
    3. A security question answer such as a mother's maiden name
    4. A fingerprint checked on the customer's own device
    Show answer

    Answer: D. A device-checked biometric cannot be typed, read aloud or seen on screen, so the remote frauds that capture passwords and OTPs do not reach it.

  5. 5. A flow uses a card and a PIN at a shop terminal. A fraudster has fitted the terminal with a skimmer but no camera or overlay. What has he captured?

    1. Both factors, the card data and the PIN together
    2. Only the PIN, so just one factor of the two
    3. Neither factor, since a skimmer alone captures nothing
    4. Only the card data, so one factor
    Show answer

    Answer: D. The skimmer copies card data (possession) but nothing captures the PIN (knowledge), so the path is incomplete.

Privacy · Terms · Refunds · Delivery