- Advanced
- About 18 min
- 5 practice questions
Philosophies of compassion: from Aristotle to Nussbaum and Bloom
Compare major accounts of compassion and pity, from Aristotle, Rousseau, Adam Smith and Schopenhauer to Nietzsche's critique, Nussbaum's cognitive account and Bloom's case against empathy, and evaluate them for public life.
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At the advanced level, compassion is not simply 'good'. Philosophers have disagreed about what it is, whether it is a reliable moral guide, and whether it respects or diminishes the people it is directed at. This lesson maps the main positions so that you can compare them and take a reasoned view.
Classical and early modern accounts
- Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, described pity as a pain felt at a serious misfortune that befalls someone who does not deserve it, of a kind that one might expect to suffer oneself.
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in the Discourse on Inequality (1755), saw pity as a natural repugnance at seeing another sentient being suffer, prior to reason, which moderates self-love.
- Adam Smith, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), built morality on sympathy, our capacity to imagine ourselves in another's situation, corrected by the standpoint of an impartial spectator.
- Arthur Schopenhauer, in On the Basis of Morality (1840), argued that compassion is the true foundation of morality: in compassion, the boundary between oneself and the other is overcome and the other's suffering moves us directly.
The critique: Nietzsche
Friedrich Nietzsche attacked pity (Mitleid) as a weakness that multiplies suffering, depresses vitality and can conceal a feeling of superiority over the sufferer. Whatever one thinks of his wider philosophy, the critique is a useful warning: help given from pity can humiliate, and a culture of pity can treat people as victims rather than agents.
Nussbaum's cognitive account
Martha Nussbaum, in Upheavals of Thought (2001), argued that compassion contains judgements, not just feelings. In her account it involves a judgement that the suffering is serious, a judgement that the person is not mainly to blame for it, and a eudaimonistic judgement that the person matters within one's own scheme of goals and concerns. She treats Aristotle's 'it could happen to me' as a useful aid rather than a necessary condition. Because compassion contains judgements, it can be educated: institutions and education can widen whom we see as mattering.
Bloom's case against empathy
Paul Bloom, in Against Empathy (2016), argued that empathy, feeling what others feel, is a poor guide to policy: it acts like a spotlight that focuses on identifiable, similar, nearby individuals and neglects statistical, distant or different victims. He defends rational compassion: caring about others' welfare, guided by reason and evidence.
| Thinker | Key claim | Strength | Limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Pity at undeserved serious misfortune one might share | Explains why fellow-feeling depends on similarity | Can narrow concern to people like us |
| Smith | Sympathy corrected by an impartial spectator | Combines feeling with fairness | Imaginative reach may be limited |
| Schopenhauer | Compassion is the basis of morality | Puts suffering at the centre | Gives less guidance on justice and rules |
| Nietzsche | Pity can humiliate and multiply suffering | Warns against condescension | Can be read as contempt for the weak |
| Nussbaum | Compassion is judgement-laden and can be educated | Shows how to widen concern | Judgements of blame can be biased |
| Bloom | Empathy is a biased spotlight; prefer rational compassion | Fits public policy | Undervalues the motivating power of feeling |
Worked evaluation
Statement: 'Compassion is too emotional to guide public administration.' Evaluation: Bloom supports the worry about empathy's bias; Nietzsche warns against pity's condescension. But Nussbaum shows that compassion contains judgements that can be examined and educated, and Smith's impartial spectator shows how feeling can be disciplined by fairness. Conclusion: administration needs rational compassion, care for welfare expressed through fair rules, evidence and attention to unseen victims, not either cold procedure or raw emotion.
Feel enough to care, judge carefully whom you are leaving out, and let fair institutions carry your compassion to people you will never see.
Key takeaways
- Aristotle, Rousseau, Smith and Schopenhauer give foundational accounts of pity, sympathy and compassion.
- Nietzsche warns that pity can humiliate.
- Nussbaum's account makes compassion judgement-laden and educable.
- Bloom argues for rational compassion over empathy in policy.
Check your understanding
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1. Who argued in On the Basis of Morality (1840) that compassion is the true foundation of morality?
- Adam Smith
- Arthur Schopenhauer
- Friedrich Nietzsche
- John Locke
Show answer
Answer: B. Schopenhauer placed compassion at the basis of morality.
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2. Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments grounds morality in:
- sympathy, corrected by the standpoint of an impartial spectator
- the will to power, as the hidden drive behind all human conduct
- the categorical imperative, a universal law reached by pure reason
- divine command, as revealed in scripture and church teaching
Show answer
Answer: A. Smith's moral theory rests on sympathy disciplined by an impartial spectator.
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3. Which is one of the judgements Nussbaum includes in compassion?
- That the sufferer deserves the suffering that has fallen on him or her
- That the suffering is trivial and will soon pass without any help
- That the person matters within one's own scheme of goals (the eudaimonistic judgement)
- That compassion is purely a bodily sensation and carries no judgement at all
Show answer
Answer: C. Nussbaum lists seriousness, non-fault and the eudaimonistic judgement.
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4. Nietzsche's critique of pity warns mainly that:
- pity is always the highest virtue and the best guide to action in public life
- pity can humiliate the sufferer, conceal superiority and multiply suffering
- pity is required by law of every public servant in a welfare state
- pity has no effect on the sufferer or on the one who feels it
Show answer
Answer: B. Nietzsche saw pity as potentially condescending and depressing to life.
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5. What does Paul Bloom recommend in place of empathy as a guide to policy?
- Indifference to the suffering of others in any form
- Strict punishment of those who cause the harm
- Pity for the sufferer, felt as strongly as possible
- Rational compassion guided by reason and evidence
Show answer
Answer: D. Bloom argues that rational compassion avoids empathy's spotlight bias.
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