| Thinker | Key claim | Strength | Limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Pity at undeserved serious misfortune one might share | Explains why fellow-feeling depends on similarity | Can narrow concern to people like us |
| Smith | Sympathy corrected by an impartial spectator | Combines feeling with fairness | Imaginative reach may be limited |
| Schopenhauer | Compassion is the basis of morality | Puts suffering at the centre | Gives less guidance on justice and rules |
| Nietzsche | Pity can humiliate and multiply suffering | Warns against condescension | Can be read as contempt for the weak |
| Nussbaum | Compassion is judgement-laden and can be educated | Shows how to widen concern | Judgements of blame can be biased |
| Bloom | Empathy is a biased spotlight; prefer rational compassion | Fits public policy | Undervalues the motivating power of feeling |
Feel enough to care, judge carefully whom you are leaving out, and let fair institutions carry your compassion to people you will never see.
- Aristotle, Rousseau, Smith and Schopenhauer give foundational accounts of pity, sympathy and compassion.
- Nietzsche warns that pity can humiliate.
- Nussbaum's account makes compassion judgement-laden and educable.
- Bloom argues for rational compassion over empathy in policy.