- Advanced
- About 18 min
- 5 practice questions
Grease or sand? Competing theories of corruption's effects
Evaluate the 'efficient grease' arguments of Leff and Huntington against Myrdal's 'soft state' critique, and explain why an ethical analysis of corruption cannot rest on efficiency alone.
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An advanced answer on corruption must deal with an uncomfortable argument: that in a rigid, over-regulated system, bribes may help get things done. This lesson sets out that argument fairly, presents the main counter-arguments, and shows how moral philosophy goes beyond the efficiency debate.
The 'grease the wheels' hypothesis
In the 1960s some scholars of development argued that corruption could have positive effects in certain conditions. Nathaniel Leff, in a 1964 article, suggested that bribery could let entrepreneurs get around bad policies and slow bureaucracies, and so promote growth. Samuel Huntington, in Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), argued that in a rapidly modernising society some corruption might be preferable to rigid, over-centralised rule, because it gave new groups a way into the system. This view is often summarised as the efficient grease hypothesis.
The 'sand in the wheels' critique
Gunnar Myrdal, in Asian Drama (1968), described many South Asian states as soft states, where laws are made but not enforced and officials have wide room for arbitrary action. He argued that corruption is not a response to delay but a cause of it: officials can create or threaten delays precisely so that they can be paid to remove them. Later research has supported this concern in many settings.
| Argument for 'grease' | Counter-argument |
|---|---|
| Bribes help firms bypass slow procedures | Officials then have reason to make procedures slower and more numerous |
| The highest briber is often the most efficient firm, so bribes allocate licences efficiently | The highest briber may simply be the best at bribing, or may plan to cut quality to recover the bribe |
| Corruption lets excluded groups into politics | It mostly entrenches those already powerful enough to pay |
| Speed money saves time | Only for those who pay; the queue lengthens for everyone else |
Why efficiency is not the whole story
Even if a particular bribe did speed things up, the ethical case against it stands on other grounds. A Kantian analysis asks whether the maxim 'pay officials to bend public rules for me' could be willed as a universal law; it cannot, because universal bribery would destroy the very public rules the briber relies on. A virtue analysis, following Aristotle, asks what habitual bribe-paying and bribe-taking do to character and to the trust that makes civic life possible. A justice analysis, in the spirit of John Rawls, asks whether a system that rations public services by ability to pay could be chosen by people who did not know whether they would be rich or poor; it would not be.
Worked evaluation
Statement: 'In a licence-raj economy, corruption was the only way business could survive, so it was functional.' A balanced evaluation: concede that rigid rules created strong incentives to bribe and that some firms survived through bribery; then argue that (1) the bribes reinforced the incentive to keep rules rigid, which is Myrdal's point; (2) the gains went to well-connected firms, not to the most productive or to consumers; (3) the moral cost, a culture in which rules are for sale, outlived the rules themselves. Conclude that the remedy for bad rules is reforming the rules, not bribing around them.
Where rules are bad, change the rules; bribing around them rewards those who keep them bad.
Key takeaways
- Leff and Huntington argued corruption might grease development under rigid rule.
- Myrdal's soft-state critique shows corruption can create the very delays it claims to cure.
- Kantian, virtue and Rawlsian analyses condemn corruption even when it appears efficient.
- The ethical answer to bad rules is reform, not bribery.
Check your understanding
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1. Which thinker described many South Asian states as 'soft states' in which laws are poorly enforced and officials can create delays to obtain bribes?
- Samuel Huntington
- Gunnar Myrdal
- Nathaniel Leff
- John Rawls
Show answer
Answer: B. Myrdal used the term soft state in Asian Drama (1968). Leff and Huntington are associated with the grease hypothesis.
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2. What is the strongest economic objection to the claim that bribes allocate licences to the most efficient firms?
- Bribes are always too small to matter in the decision about who gets the licence, so they cannot affect the outcome
- Efficient firms never pay bribes, because they win licences on merit and need no favour from officials
- The highest briber may be the best at bribing or plan to cut quality, not the most productive firm
- Licences have no value to a firm, and so no firm would pay a bribe for one in the first place
Show answer
Answer: C. Willingness to pay a bribe reflects connections and plans to recover costs, not necessarily productive efficiency.
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3. Rawls's veil of ignorance argument against a system that rations public services by ability to pay rests on the idea that:
- people who did not know whether they would be rich or poor would not choose it
- it maximises the total happiness of all the members of society taken together
- it builds virtuous habits among citizens and officials in the long run
- rules should never change once they have been made by the state
Show answer
Answer: A. Behind the veil, not knowing one's position, a rational person would not choose a system that disadvantages the poor in access to basic services.
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4. Huntington's argument in Political Order in Changing Societies is best summarised as:
- corruption is always the main cause of underdevelopment in every country and at every stage of its history
- laws should never be enforced in a society that is still modernising, since rules only obstruct growth
- bribery is morally good in every society, because it rewards those who are willing to take risks
- some corruption might be preferable to rigid, over-centralised rule in a rapidly modernising society
Show answer
Answer: D. Huntington suggested corruption could function as a way into the system for new groups in modernising states, while not calling it morally good.
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5. Why does a Kantian analysis condemn bribery even when it seems efficient?
- Because it produces less total happiness in every case, whatever the circumstances of the act
- Because the maxim of bribing to bend public rules cannot be universalised without destroying those rules
- Because Kant was against all government and so against all officials who take decisions
- Because it is not illegal, and so the only possible objection to it is a moral one
Show answer
Answer: B. If everyone bribed to bend rules, public rules would cease to function. The maxim defeats itself when universalised.
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