| Grouping | Legal basis | Permanent body | How it decides |
|---|---|---|---|
| SAARC | Charter | Secretariat, Kathmandu | Unanimity; bilateral and contentious issues excluded |
| ASEAN | Bangkok Declaration, later a formal charter | Secretariat, Jakarta | Consultation and consensus |
| European Union | Treaties, including Maastricht | Common institutions | Some laws binding on members; majority voting in some areas |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty | Headquarters, Brussels | Consensus; Article 5 mutual defence |
| IMF and World Bank | Articles of Agreement | Headquarters, Washington, D.C. | Votes weighted by each member's financial share |
| WTO | Founding agreement | Secretariat, Geneva | Consensus in practice; binding dispute settlement |
| SCO | Charter | Secretariat, Beijing; anti-terrorism structure, Tashkent | Consensus |
| G20 | No charter | None; rotating presidency | Consensus statements, not binding |
| BRICS | No charter | None; rotating chair | Consensus; but owns the treaty-based New Development Bank |
| Quad | No treaty | None | Joint statements among four partners |
Treaty + secretariat + binding rules = durable but slow. No charter + rotating chair = flexible but non-binding. Read the design and the behaviour follows.
Key takeaways: ask four questions of any grouping - legal basis, permanent body, decision rule, binding force. SAARC's unanimity and exclusion of bilateral issues explain its stalls; the G20's informality explains both its speed and its non-binding outcomes; weighted voting explains the reform debate at the IMF and World Bank.