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- 5 practice questions
Settlement risk in deferred net systems: when a bank cannot pay
Recalculate net positions when a participant fails, explain the knock-on effect on other banks, and describe how collateral, guarantee arrangements and legal finality contain the risk.
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Deferred net settlement saves liquidity, as the netting lesson showed. The price is a waiting period during which banks' net positions are only promises. If a bank with a net debit cannot pay at settlement, what happens to everyone else? This lesson works through that case with invented figures, because it is the clearest way to see why net systems need risk controls and why the law on settlement finality matters.
Positions depend on everyone
A bank's net position is calculated from all the session's payments, including those from the bank that might fail. If that bank cannot pay, one historical approach is to unwind: remove all payments to and from the failed bank and recalculate everyone else's positions. The danger is that a bank that expected to receive may now have to pay, perhaps more than it has, so one failure can spread to others.
Unwinding removes the failed bank's payments and recalculates every position. A net receiver can become a net payer. Controls: collateral, guarantee arrangements, limits, and legal finality.
Worked example 1: unwinding
Suppose in one session: A pays B ₹100 crore, B pays C ₹80 crore, C pays A ₹60 crore, D pays A ₹50 crore, D pays B ₹30 crore, D pays C ₹40 crore, B pays D ₹20 crore and C pays D ₹10 crore. Find the net positions. Then suppose D fails and its payments are removed. Recalculate. Working: with D: A receives 60 + 50 = 110, pays 100: +10. B receives 100 + 30 = 130, pays 80 + 20 = 100: +30. C receives 80 + 40 = 120, pays 60 + 10 = 70: +50. D receives 20 + 10 = 30, pays 120: −90. Sum 0. Without D: A receives 60, pays 100: −40. B receives 100, pays 80: +20. C receives 80, pays 60: +20. Sum 0. Answer: A goes from receiving ₹10 crore to paying ₹40 crore. A did nothing wrong, yet it now needs ₹40 crore it did not plan for.
How systems contain the risk
- Collateral: participants pledge assets so that, if one cannot pay, its collateral funds its net debit.
- Guarantee arrangements: participants contribute to a fund that can complete settlement if a member defaults.
- Limits: caps on how large a net debit a participant may run.
- Legal finality: the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 backs netting and the finality of settlement, so a completed settlement cannot be undone by a failed participant's liquidator.
With these controls, a system can complete settlement even when one bank fails, rather than unwinding, which protects the other participants. The exact rules and amounts differ from system to system and change over time, so none are given here.
Worked example 2: sizing collateral
Suppose a net session ends with positions P +20, Q +30, R +10 and S −60 (₹ crore). (a) If each bank must hold collateral equal to its own net debit, how much is held? (b) If S fails and its payments are unwound, P's position becomes −30, Q's +20 and R's +10. What is the advantage of collateral here? Working: (a) only S is in debit, so collateral = ₹60 crore. (b) Without collateral, unwinding would turn P from receiving 20 to paying 30, a swing of 50. With S's ₹60 crore of collateral, the system can pay out the original positions and P receives its ₹20 crore as planned. Answer: ₹60 crore; collateral lets settlement complete and spares P a ₹50 crore swing.
Compare this with real-time gross settlement. There, each payment is final when it settles, so no bank ever holds an open net position that depends on another bank's later payment. The two designs trade liquidity against this kind of risk, which is why both exist side by side.
Key takeaways: net positions depend on every participant's payments; unwinding a failed bank can turn a net receiver into a net payer; collateral, guarantee arrangements and limits allow settlement to be completed instead; the PSS Act, 2007 gives legal backing to netting and settlement finality; and gross real-time systems avoid the problem by settling each payment finally.
Check your understanding
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1. Suppose in a deferred net session the positions are P +20, Q +30, R +10 and S −60 (₹ crore). S then fails to pay. If S's payments are removed and positions recalculated, P's position becomes −30. What does this show?
- Netting removes all risk from the system
- A bank expecting to receive can end up having to pay when another participant fails
- P was always the failing bank
- Failure of one bank never affects the others in a net system
Show answer
Answer: B. P was a net receiver only because of S's payments to it; once they are removed, P owes 30. This is the knock-on risk of deferred net settlement.
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2. Why does real-time gross settlement not face the problem of unwinding a session?
- Each payment is settled finally as it goes, so no bank waits on a net position
- It never handles large payments
- It settles only once a week
- It is operated by NPCI
Show answer
Answer: A. In RTGS each payment is final when settled; there are no open net positions to be recalculated if a bank later fails.
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3. Suppose a net system's positions are +20, +30, +10 and −60 (₹ crore). If each participant must hold collateral at least equal to its own net debit position, how much collateral must be held in total?
- ₹120 crore
- ₹60 crore
- ₹0
- ₹20 crore
Show answer
Answer: B. Only the bank in net debit needs collateral, and it owes 60. The net creditors (+20, +30, +10) need none under this rule.
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4. What does the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 provide about a settlement completed under a system's rules?
- It is final and is protected even if a participant later becomes insolvent
- It can be reversed at any time by the participant's liquidator
- It is final only if settled by cheque
- It needs a court's approval before it is final
Show answer
Answer: A. The Act backs settlement finality and netting, so a completed settlement stands even if a participant later fails.
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5. Which tool reduces the risk that a participant's failure disrupts a deferred net system?
- Allowing participants to reverse settled payments
- Increasing the time between settlements
- Requiring participants to keep collateral or contribute to a guarantee arrangement
- Removing the central bank from settlement
Show answer
Answer: C. Collateral or guarantee arrangements provide funds to complete settlement if a participant cannot pay; the other options increase risk.
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